When Should Federal Courts Require Psychotherapists to Testify About Their Patients? - An Interpretation of Jaffee v. Redmond by Cantu, Daniel A.
University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1998 Article 15
1998
When Should Federal Courts Require
Psychotherapists to Testify About Their Patients? -
An Interpretation of Jaffee v. Redmond
Daniel A. Cantu
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal
Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cantu, Daniel A. (1998) "When Should Federal Courts Require Psychotherapists to Testify About Their Patients? - An Interpretation
of Jaffee v. Redmond," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1998, Article 15.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1998/iss1/15
When Should Federal Courts Require
Psychotherapists to Testify About Their
Patients? An Interpretation of Jaffee v
Redmond
Daniel A Cantut
Does the right to a fair trial include the right to exclude psy-
chotherapist testimony, no matter how serious the crime or how
important the testimony? The Supreme Court in Jaffee v
Redmond' recognized a basic psychotherapist-patient privilege,
but left the task of establishing exceptions to that privilege to
future courts.2
All fifty states have enacted a psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege of one sort or another.' Unfortunately, the states vary
widely in allowing exceptions to the privilege, leaving federal
courts with little consistent guidance.4 Some states allow virtu-
ally no exceptions.5 Others terminate the privilege whenever the
patient becomes a threat to others.6 Still others exempt entire
categories of crime from the privilege,7 or recognize no privilege in
any criminal trial.'
The variation in state privilege law presents a potential
problem to federal courts. Federal courts sitting in states with no
exceptions risk undermining the law of the state if they allow any
exceptions at all. Patients reassured by the presence of a state
t BA. 1983, University of California, Berkeley; M.PA- 1986, Princeton University;
J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Chicago.
518 US 1 (1996).
2 Id at 18, citing Upjohn v United States, 449 US 383, 386 (1981) (explaining that
"([b]ecause this is the first case in which we have recognized a psychotherapist privilege, it
is neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its full contours in a way that would 'govern
all conceivable future questions in this area!").
See note 73.
518 US at 27.
See note 74.
6 See note 76.
See note 75.
See Va Code §§ 19.2, 271.2-271.3 (1997) (specifying husband-wife and priest-
penitent privileges but not a psychotherapist-patient privilege); Tex R Crim Evid 509
(1996) (disallowing the privilege in civil cases of child abuse and neglect). See also Va
Code § 8.01-400.2 (1997).
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privilege may refuse to speak freely if they know their secrets
may be revealed in federal court. On the other hand, federal en-
forcement of a strong privilege in states with many exceptions
might prove to be nothing but an empty gesture. Patients un-
willing to speak freely to their psychotherapists may simply ig-
nore any federal privilege if the state courts do not protect them.
This problem may occur in the context of any of the eviden-
tiary privileges, but a lack of grounding in history and culture
makes it particularly acute for the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. The attorney-client privilege has roots dating to the Roman
Empire.9 The priest-penitent privilege dates back to medieval
Europe." The husband-wife privilege dates to the earliest days of
English common law.1" The Presidential privilege has its roots in
the Constitution's separation of powers. The psychotherapist-
patient privilege, however, dates only to the 1950s,'3 and has not
produced the expectations of confidentiality created by the long
history and deep cultural roots of the other privileges. Without
those expectations, it bears a greater burden in showing that the
benefits of preserving confidentiality outweigh the resulting loss
of evidence.
This Comment explores the contours of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, beginning with its legal underpinnings, con-
tinuing with its impact on relations between doctors and patients,
and ending with philosophical, moral and political arguments
supporting and opposing exceptions to the privilege. It concludes
with a recommendation that federal courts incorporate state
privilege law by reference into the federal common law. The pro-
posal avoids undermining state laws, needlessly rejecting rele-
vant evidence, and eliminates the need for a costly and fruitless
exploration by the federal judiciary of the merits of the privilege.
It also L' 'plifies the law for both therapists and patients.
This omment includes three parts. Part I discusses the le-
gal basis for the psychotherapist-patient privilege. It examines
Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 501, which governs federal evi-
dentiary privileges, and discusses Jaffee v Redmond" and other
Supreme Court privilege cases. Part I ends with an overview of
Daniel W. Shuman and Myron F. Weiner, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A
Critical Examination 49 (Charles C Thomas 1987) ("The Privilege Study").
10 Id.
" Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 43 (1980).
12 United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 705 (1974).
Harvard Law Review Assn, Developments in the Law - Privileged Communica-
tions, 98 Harv L Rev 1454, 1530 (1985).
" 518 US 1 (1996).
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the privilege laws of the fift states.
FRE 501 and the Supreme Courts privilege cases allow
courts broad discretion to define and shape privileges in light of
"reason and experience."15 Parts II and III of this Comment ex-
plore each of these concepts in detail. Part II reviews the na-
tional "experience" with the privilege as summarized in empirical
studies on its impact on therapists and patients. Part III dis-
cusses "reason" in the form of moral, philosophical and political
arguments supporting and opposing exceptions to the privilege.
I. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE FEDERAL PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Distilled to its essence, federal law allows courts wide discre-
tion to shape privileges "in light of reason and experience."16
Congress effectively delegated rulemaking authority to the courts
by rejecting a detailed privilege statute proposed by the Supreme
Court, 7 and replacing it with a procedural guideline that allows
courts to establish privileges as they see fit as long as they show
due regard for precedent. 8 The Supreme Court in United States
v Trammel9 emphasized that FRE 501 provides great flexibility
for federal courts to alter privileges over time." It made the same
point again when it established the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in Jaffee v Redmond.2'
A. Jaffee v Redmond
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Jaffee v Redmond to
resolve a circuit split on the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Police officer Mary Lu Redmond, responding to a fight in progress
at an apartment complex, shot and killed a suspect allegedly
wielding a butcher knifeY After the shooting, Redmond partici-
pated in approximately fift counseling sessions with a clinical
social worker.24 The victim's estate sued under federal and state
law for violation of his constitutional rights by use of excessive
"5 FRE 501.
18 Id.
See Part I C.
,S Id.
19 445 US 40 (1979).
Id at 47.
21 518 US 1, 8 (1996).
2 Id.
Id at4.
2" Id at 5.
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force and for wrongful death.25 When the estate sought access to
records of the counseling sessions, Redmond claimed a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege."
The Court began its analysis with an examination of FRE
501, finding that its direction to define the common law of privi-
lege "in light of reason and experience" allows federal courts the
freedom to develop and refine privileges as they see fit.27 The
Court noted that the right of the public "to every man's evidence"
has guided the common law for centuries, and that privileges of-
fer rare exceptions to that basic principle.' The psychotherapist-
patient relationship justifies an exception to that principle if the
need to preserve confidential communications between doctor and
patient outweighs the need for probative evidence.
In the Court's view, the patient has a strong interest in pri-
vacy because the possibility of disclosure, resulting in embar-
rassment or disgrace, may impede development of the therapeutic
relationship. 0 The privilege protects the public interest by facili-
tating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suf-
fering from mental or emotional problems.3 The Court then ar-
gued that the privilege will cost little in terms of unavailable evi-
dence because, without a privilege, the patient would refuse to
divulge legally damaging information to the psychotherapist in
the first place.32
The Supreme Court then turned to the importance of harmo-
nizing state and federal privilege law, arguing that federal courts
should take state policy decisions into account in areas domi-
nated by state law." In light of the unanimous state recognition
of the privilege, the Court reasoned that the lack of a federal
privilege would undermine the policy decisions of the states be-
cause a state promise of confidentiality would have little value if
the patient knew that federal courts would not honor it.'
B. Cases Prior to Jaffee v Redmond
Before Jaffee, the Court had generally limited the scope of
518 US at 5.
2 Id.
Id at 8, quoting FRE 501.
' Id at 9, quoting United States v Bryan, 339 US 323, 331 (1950).
518 US at 9, citing Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 51 (1980).
" Id.
3' Id at 11.
32 Id.
518 US at 12-13.
Id at 13.
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existing common law privileges. The Court explained its basic
position in United States v Bryan," stating that because "the
public.., has a right to every man's evidence,7 6 everyone has the
duty to testify, a duty that may be avoided only under exceptional
circumstances. Using this premise, the Court in United States v
Nixon35 held that a generalized privilege must give way in light of
a strong, demonstrable need for evidence in a particular set of
circumstances.39 In Fisher v United States, the Court emphasized
that a privilege exists only to the extent absolutely necessary to
achieve its purpose. °
The utilitarian justification of the psychotherapy privilege
posits that it encourages confidential communications between
therapist and patient.4' Under Fisher, courts should construe
privileges narrowly,42 enforcing them only when necessary to
achieve their purpose. If a state will not protect a particular
communication, the patient will ignore the federal privilege, and
that privilege will serve no purpose. If, on the other hand, the
federal government fails to extend a privilege to a communication
protected by the state, it violates Jaffee by undermining the law
of the state.43
Because states vary a great deal in the coverage of their
privilege statutes,' any uniform federal privilege would violate
either Fisher or Jaffee by establishing a useless privilege or un-
dermining state law.
C. Using State Privileges in Federal Cases
This Comment proposes that federal courts should incorpo-
rate state psychotherapist-patient privilege law into the federal
339 US 323, 342 (1950) (holding that the secretary of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Committee may not refuse to testify before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities and that the House Committee had the authority to subpoena the Refugee
Committee's records).
Id at 331, quoting John T. Naughton, ed, 8 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Com-
mon Law § 2192 at 70 (Little, Brown 1961).
339 US at 331.
418 US 683, 713 (1974) (holding that an invocation of the executive privilege based
only upon a generalized interest in confidentiality cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law).
Id.
425 US 391, 403, 414 (1976) (holding that accountant's documents in the hands of
defendant's attorneys were not protected by the attorney-client privilege).
See Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 5 (cited in note 9).
42 425 US at 403.
Jaffee v Redmond, 518 US 1, 13 (1996).
" See Part I D.
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common law by reference.45 Federal courts may incorporate state
law into the federal common law when: (1) no federal statute ap-
plies, (2) application of a uniform federal standard would impair
the functioning of a state law, and (3) there is no overriding fed-
eral principle that would demand national uniformity.46
In 1939, the Supreme Court first established this principle in
Board of County Commissioners v United States,4 which involved
a dispute between the federal government and a municipality
over whether a judgment for the United States, in an action to
recover illegally exacted county taxes, should include interest.48
The Court explained that the absence of either a statute or legis-
lative history left a court free to consider "public convenience." 9
Finding no reason to place the federal government in a preferred
position over aggrieved state taxpayers, the Court held that state
law applied."
More recently, in United States v Kimbell Foods Inc,51 the
Court wrote that state interests in preserving uniform property
laws override the federal government's interest in tax collection.52
' Under the rule proposed by this Comment, federal courts will at some point have
to create a set of decision rules to determine which state privilege law to apply when sev-
eral different possibilities exist. This might occur, for example, when one state licenses
the psychotherapist, but the crime in question occurs in another state. Although a thor-
ough discussion of this question lies beyond the scope of this Comment, one sensible solu-
tion would be to apply the privilege law of the state licensing the psychotherapist. This
would minimize the confusion of the therapist and protect the expectations of the patient.
For a further discussion of this issue, see Earl C. Dudley, Federalism and Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 Georgetown L J 1781, 1836-39
(1994) (discussing the question of vertical choice of law in privilege cases). For a different
solution, see Klaxon Co v Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co, 313 US 487 (1941) (holding
that a federal court should apply the privilege rule that a court of the state where it is
sitting would apply under the state's choice of law rules).
" Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, eds, Hart &
Wecschler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 765 (Foundation 4th ed 1996)
("The Federal Courts) quoting United States v Kimbell Foods, Inc, 440 US 715, 726-30
(1979).
' Fallon, et al, eds, The Federal Courts at 763, (quoting Board of County Commis-
sioners v United States, 308 US 343, 349-52 (1939)).
308 US at 348-49.
41 Id at 351 ("Having left the matter at large for judicial determination within the
framework of familiar remedies equitable in their nature ... Congress has left us free to
take into account appropriate considerations of'public convenience.'... Nothing seems to
us more appropriate than due regard for local institutions and local interests.&").
Id at 352 ("In the absence of explicit legislative policy cutting across state inter-
ests, we draw upon a general principle that the beneficiaries of federal rights are not to
have a privileged position over other aggrieved taxpayers in their relation with the states
or their political subdivisions.").
" 440 US 715 (1979).
Id at 739-40
("[Blusinessmen depend on state commercial law to provide the stability
essential for reliable evaluation of the risks involved .... Creditors who
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The Supreme Court expanded this principle in Kamen v Kemper
Financial Services.3 The Kamen Court held that when state law
predominates in a particular area, as it does in corporate law,
federal courts should incorporate state law into federal common
law.'
The psychotherapist-patient privilege presents a classic ex-
ample of an area in which courts should incorporate state stat-
utes into the federal common law. Despite an opportunity to do
so, Congress declined to legislate on the matter.55 The applicable
federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 leaves it entirely
to the courts.5" States have an overriding interest in preserving
and protecting the privilege they created." A uniform federal
standard would interfere with state law, nd no identifiable prin-
ciple justifies national uniformity. 9
One could argue that applying the canon of construction ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius° to FRE 501 suggests that fed-
eral courts should not apply state law to federal questions be-
cause FRE 501 only requires the use of state privilege law in di-
versity cases.5 ' However, this conclusion ignores both the legisla-
justifiably rely on state law to obtain superior leins would have their ex-
pectations thwarted whenever a federal contractual security interest
suddenly appeared and took precedence .... Thus, the prudent course is
to adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal rule of decision
until Congress strikes a different accommodation.").
500 US 90 (1991).
Id at 98-99. The Kamen rule does not apply when state law permits behaviors
prohibited by the federal act or undermines the federal policy underlying the act. Id at 99.
Eric D. Green, Charles R. Nesson and Peter L. Murray, eds, Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, with Selected Legislative History, California Evidence Code, and Case Supplement
103-06 (Aspen 1997) ("Federal Rules of Evidence").
The Federal Rules of Evidence is a statute enacted by Congress. For an explana-
tion of the development of the Rules see Dudley, 82 Georgetown L J at 1798 (cited in note
45).
,7 FRE 501. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the
Contextual Synthesis, 73 Neb L Rev 511, 519-23 (1994) (arguing that legislative history
suggests that because Congress simply could not settle the contours of a privilege, it left
the issue to the courts for settlement).
Shuman and Weiner, The Privelege Study at 56-57 (cited in note 9).
See Part II E.
Black's Law Dictionary 581 (West 6th ed 1990) ("[T]he expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another.").
" FRE 501, in relevant part, states:
... the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political sub-
division thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state
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tive history and subsequent interpretation of FRE 501.
The Advisory Committee on Evidence of the Judicial Confer-
ence had recommended that the rule of Erie Railroad Co v Tomp-
kins,62 requiring application of state substantive law in diversity
cases, not apply to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Congress re-
jected this suggestion. The House Judiciary Committee found no
federal interest strong enough to justify departing from state
policy when an element of a claim or defense is not grounded
upon a federal question." The House therefore added a provision
to FRE 501 that bound federal courts to apply the state's privi-
lege law in actions founded upon a state-created right or
defense.' The Senate Judiciary Committee explicitly concurred
in this judgment."
The clause of FRE 501 mandating the use of state privilege
law in diversity cases responds to the Advisory Committee's sug-
gestion and was never intended to affect resolution of federal
question cases. On the contrary, courts must interpret FRE 501
as providing the most freedom of action possible in cases decided
under federal law. The Senate Judiciary Committee supported
this interpretation when it wrote that FRE 501 reflects the view
that privilege rules should be shaped by the courts according to
the unique characteristics of each privilege." The plain language
of FRE 501 emphasizes the ability of federal courts to create and
define privileges as they see fit, "in light of reason and experi-
ence.'c The Supreme Court has taken the language and history
6f FRE 501 as delegating great freedom of action to courts in de-
vising privileges in federal question cases, 69 as stated in both
Trammel" and Jaffee.7 Plain language, legislative history, and
prior interpretations all show that the language of FRE 501 per-
mits the incorporation of state privilege law in federal matters.
or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
state law.
304 US 64 (1938).
' Green, et al, eds, Federal Rules of Evidence at 104-05 (cited in note 55).
Id at 105.
Id.
Id at 106.
Green, et al, eds, Federal Rules of Evidence at 106 (cited in note 55).
FRE 501.
69 Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 47 (1980).
" Id at 48-50. ("In rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 501, Congress
manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege.").
71 518 US 1, 15 (1996).
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D. State Psychotherapist Privilege Statutes
All states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes
incorporating the psychotherapist-patient privilege.72 State psy-
chotherapist-patient privileges fall into one of four major catego-
ries.13 Thirteen states treat the psychotherapy privilege as iden-
tical to the attorney-client privilege. 4 Twenty-two states revoke
u Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 6,55 (cited in note 9).
A majority of states allow otherwise confidential information to be used (1) in in-
voluntary civil commitment proceedings, (2) subject to court-ordered medical examina-
tions, or (3) when the defense raises psychiatric evidence as an element of a claim or de-
fense. All three represent narrow, technical exceptions and none will be discussed in this
Comment.
Twenty-six states allow an exemption for involuntary hospitalization proceedings.
See Ala Code § 34-26-2 (1991); Alaska Stat § 08.86.200 (Michie 1996), Alaska R Evid 504;
Ark R Evid 503; Del R Evid 503; DC Code § 14-307 (1981 & Supp 1997); Fla Stat Ann §
90.503 (West 1979 & Supp 1998); Hawaii R Evid 504.1; Idaho R Evid 503; Ind Code § 25-
33-1-17 (1993 & Supp 1997); Ky R Evid 507; La Rev Stat Ann § 510 (West 1995); Me R
Evid 503; Md Cts and Jud Proc Code Ann § 9-109 (1995); Miss R Evid 503; Neb Rev Stat §
27-504 (1994); NJ Rev Stat § 45:14B-28 (1995); NM R Evid 11-504; ND R Evid 503; Okla
Stat Ann §12-2503 (West 1993); RI Gen Laws § 5-37.3-6 (1995 & Supp 1997); SD Cod
Laws § 19-13-9 (1995); Term Code Ann § 24-1-207 (1980 & Supp 1997); Utah R Evid 506;
Vt R Evid 503; Wash Rev Code Ann § 18.83.110 (West 1989 & Supp 1998); Wis Stat Ann §
905.04 (West 1993 & Supp 1997).
Twenty-seven states allow an exemption for a court-ordered examination. See
Alaska Stat § 08.86.200 (Michie 1996), Alaska R Evid 504; Ark R Evid 503; Colo Rev Stat
§ 13-90-107 (1993 & Supp 1997); Conn Gen Stat Conn § 52-146c (West 1991 & Supp 1997);
Del R Evid 503; Fla Stat Ann § 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp 1998); Hawaii R Evid 504.1;
Idaho R Evid 503; Ky R Evid 507; La Rev Stat Ann § 510 (West 1995); Me R Evid 503; Md
Cts and Jud Proc Code Ann § 9-109 (1995); Mass Ann Laws ch 233, § 20B (Michie/Law Co-
op 1986 & Supp 1997); Miss R Evid 503; Neb Rev Stat §27-504 (1994); NM R Evid 11-504;
ND R Evid 503; Okla Stat Ann § 2503 (West 1993); Or Rev Stat § 40.230 (1997); RI Gen
Laws § 5-37.3-6 (1995 & Supp 1997); SD Cod Laws § 19-13-10 (1995); Term Code Ann § 24-
1-207 (1980 & Supp 1997); Utah R Evid 506; Vt R Evid 503; W Va Code § 27-3-1 (1992);
Wis Stat Ann § 905.04 (West 1993); Wyo Stat Ann § 33-27-123 (Michie 1997).
Twenty-nine states provide no privilege for information raised as evidence for a
claim or defense. See Alaska Stat § 08.86.200 (Michie 1996); Ark R Evid 503; Conn Gen
Stat Ann § 52-146c (West 1991 & Supp 1997); Del R Evid 503; DC Code § 14-307 (1981 &
Supp 1997); Fla Stat Ann §90.503 (West 1979 & Supp 1998); Hawaii R Evid 504.1; Idaho
R Evid 503; ILCS ch 225, § 15/5 (West 1996); Iowa Code Ann § 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp
1997); Ky R Evid 507; La Rev Stat Ann § 510 (West 1995); Me R Evid 503; Md Cts and Jud
Proc Code Ann § 9-109 (1995); Mass Ann Laws ch 233, § 20B (Michie/Law Co-op 1986 &
Supp 1997); Miss R Evid 503 (1996); Neb Rev Stat § 27-504 (1994); NM R Evid 11-504; ND
R Evid 503; Okla Stat Ann § 2503 (West 1993); Or Rev Stat § 504 (1997); RI Gen Laws § 5-
37.3-6 (1995 & Supp 1997); SC Code Ann § 19-11-95 (1976 & Supp 1997); SD Cod Laws §
19-13-11 (1995); Term Code Ann § 24-1-207 (1980 & Supp 1997); Utah R Evid 506; Vt R
Evid 503; Wis Stat Ann § 905.04 (West 1993); Wyo Stat Ann § 33-27-123 (Michie 1997).
' See Ala Code § 34-26-2 (1991); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 32-2085 (West 1992 & Supp
1997); 1997 Colo Rev Stat § 1-90-107 (1993 & Supp 1997); Ga Code Ann § 24-9-21 (Michie
1995); Kan Stat Ann § 74-5323 (1992); Minn Stat Ann § 595.02 (West 1988 & Supp 1998);
Mo Ann Stat § 491.060 (Vernon 1996); Mont Code Ann § 26-1-807 (1997); NH Rev Stat
Ann § 330-A:19 (1995); NJ Rev Stat § 45:14B-28 (1995); 1997 NY Laws 4507; Pa Cons Stat
Ann § 5944 (Purdon 1992 & Supp 1997); Wash Rev Code Ann § 18.83.110 (West 1989 &
Supp 1998).
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the privilege in trials involving specific crimes, most commonly
child abuse and homicide.75 Ten states terminate the privilege if
the patient poses an imminent threat to an identifiable third per-
son.76 Three states allow the court to weigh the value of the evi-
dence obtained against the privacy of the patient on a case-by-
case basis."7
The wide variation in coverage by the states underscores the
difficulty federal courts will have in attempting to define a na-
tional privilege. A uniform privilege must either undermine state
law as described in Jaffee" or serve no useful purpose as dis-
cussed in Fisher."9 Federal courts must choose which type of er-
ror they prefer.
II. USING "EXPERIENCE" TO INTERPRET JAFFEE VREDMOND
The Federal Rules of Evidence direct courts to define privi-
leges in the light of "reason and experience.8 In this context,
"reason" implies the use of abstract logic to arrive at a conclusion;
"experience" requires that courts bring factual or empirical evi-
dence to bear on their decision. The reasoning of the Jaffee Court
leads to a series of testable empirical questions."' Will patients
7' Fourteen states exempt child abuse cases from the psychotherapy privilege. See
Alaska: Stat § 08.86.200 (Michie 1996); Cal Penal Code § 11171 (West 1992); Conn Gen
Stat Ann § 52-146c (West 1991 & Supp 1997); Del R Evid 503; Idaho R Evid 503; La Rev
$tat Ann § 510 (West 1995); Minn Stat Ann § 595.02 (1988 & Supp 1998); Neb Rev Stat §
27-504 (1994); NC Gen Stat § 8-53.3 (1986 & Supp 1997); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2317.02
(Baldwin 1994 & Supp 1996); Vt R Evid 503; Va Code § 8.01-400.2 (1992); Wis Stat Ann §
905.04 (West 1993 & Supp 1997); Wyo Stat Ann § 33-27-123 (Michie 1997). Four states
exempt trials involving homicide or other violent crimes. See DC Code § 14-307 (1981 &
Supp 1997); ILCS ch 225, § 15/5 (West 1996); Ind Code § 25-33-1-17 (1993 & Supp 1997);
Wis Stat Ann § 905.04 (West 1993). Two states exempt all crimes. See Va Code § 8.01-
400.2 (1992); Tex R Crim Evid 509. The District of Columbia exempts medical fraud cases.
DC Code § 14-307 (1981 & Supp 1997). Nebraska exempts cases involving controlled
substances. Neb Rev Stat § 27-504 (1994).
" See Alaska Stat § 08.86.200 (Michie 1996); Cal Evid Code § 1024 (West 1995);
Conn Gen Stat Conn § 52-146c (West 1991 & Supp 1997); Mass Ann Laws ch 233, § 20B
(Michie/Law Co-op 1986 & Supp 1997); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2317.02 (Baldwin 1994 &
Supp 1996); RI Gen Laws § 5-37.3-6 (1995 & Supp 1997); SC Code Ann § 19-11-95 (1976 &
Supp 1997); Tenn Code Ann § 24-1-207 (1980 & Supp 1997); W Va Code § 27-3-1 (1992);
Wyo Stat Ann § 33-27-123 (Michie 1997).
' See W Va Code § 27-3-1 (1992); NH Rev Stat Ann § 330-A19 (1995) (creating an
exemption to the privilege when "such disclosure is required by a court order," without
specifying the conditions of such order); NC Gen Stat § 8-53.3 (1986 & Supp 1997) (allow-
ing the presiding judge to "compel disclosure, either at the trial or prior thereto, if in his or
her opinion disclosure is necessary to a proper administration ofjustice").
518 US 1, 11 (1996).
" Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 403 (1976).
FRE 501.
Jaffee v Redmond, 518 US 1, 11-12 (1996).
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know or understand privilege law? If so, will that prevent them
from divulging incriminating information? Will exceptions to the
privilege provide useful evidence for courts?
A. Overview of Empirical Studies
Advocates of the psychotherapy privilege have claimed that it
will increase the number of patients visiting psychotherapists,
encourage patients to begin therapy earlier, and reduce the ten-
dency of patients to withhold information.82 Some commentators
have assumed that such benefits will accrue to the patient popu-
lation as a whole.' This Comment terms this supposition the
strong-form hypothesis.
Other commentators argue that the privilege and its limits
matter only to patients to whom the limits are consequential,
such as individuals with tendencies toward violence, child abuse,
or other aberrant behavior.' This Comment calls this second
theory the weak-form hypothesis. Studies focusing on both the
strong- and weak-form hypotheses fail to show an empirical basis
for the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
B. Strong-Form Hypothesis
Daniel Shuman and Myron Weiner tested the strong-form
hypothesis through surveys of patients, students, and therapists
conducted in three American states and two Canadian
provinces.' The tests consisted of three separate surveys." The
first tested the attitudes of participants before and after recogni-
tion of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Texas.87 The sec-
ond survey compared responses of students, patients and thera-
pists in South Carolina and West Virginia before recognition of
the privilege with those in Texas after recognition. ' The third
compared attitudes toward confidentiality in Ontario, Canada,
which recognizes no privilege, with those in Quebec, Canada,
which recognizes a general right to privacy that covers psycho-
therapist-patient communications. 89
Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 33-37 (cited in note 9).
Id at 110-13.
Daniel 0. Taube and Amiram Elwork, Researching the Effects of Confidentiality
Law on Patients'Self Disclosures, 21 Prof Psych: Res & Prac 72, 74 (1990).
Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 81 (cited in note 9).
Id.
87 Id.
Id.
Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 81 (cited in note 9).
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Shuman and Weiner found no support for the strong-form
hypothesis, challenging the basic assumptions of most privilege
statutes." Only 20 percent of the lay participants knew or
guessed correctly the privilege law in their area.9 Although pa-
tients regarded confidentiality as important, they looked to the
character of the therapist rather than the law to ensure confiden-
tiality.2 The number of visits to therapists did not increase in
Texas after introduction of the privilege.93 Although 41 percent of
patients admitted to withholding information from their thera-
pists, no statistical relationship existed between the lack of a
privilege and the number of patients who admitted to hiding
something.94
Other studies lend support to the Shuman-Weiner criticism
of the strong-form hypothesis. Researchers have found that nei-
ther the general public nor patients understand privilege law,9
and that mental health clients cannot differentiate between pri-
vacy as an ethical versus a legal concept.' Patients concerned
with privacy focused on the possibility that the therapist might
reveal confidences to the employer, family or friends of the pa-
tient,97 not the courts.
Studies claiming to support the strong-form hypothesis show
that the success of therapy depends on trust between patient and
counselor,98 which presumably forms the basis for the legal privi-
lege. However, a relationship built on trust is more complicated
than a legal privilege. If the patient bases her trust on the reli-
Ability of her therapist rather than an investigation of the law,
courts can obtain evidence without chilling the practice of psycho-
therapy.
Id at 110-13.
Id at 111.
Id.
Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 111 (cited in note 9).
Id at 112.
David J. Miller and Mark Thelen, Knowledge and Beliefs About Confidentiality in
Psychotherapy, 17 Prof Psych: Res & Prac 15, 15 (1986).
' John McGuire, Phillip Toal and Burton Blau, The Adult Client's Conception of
Confidentiality in the Therapeutic Relationship, 16 Prof Psych: Res & Prac 375, 381
(1985).
Id at 377.
Kathryn Woods and J. Regis McNamara, Confidentiality: Its Effects on Interviewee
Behavior, 11 Prof Psych 714, 720 (1980) (reporting that individuals receiving the promise
of confidentiality were more open in their disclosures than those given instructions of non-
confidentiality); Thomas Merluzzi and Cheryl Brischetto, Breach of Confidentiality and
Perceived Trustworthiness of Counselors, 30 J Couns Psych 245, 250 (1983) (associating a
breach of confidentiality in cases involving highly serious client problems with signifi-
cantly lower patient estimations of therapist trustworthiness).
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C. Weak-Form Hypothesis
Some results of the Shuman and Weiner study support the
weak-form hypothesis. 9 About 6 percent of the patients surveyed
would have sought counseling earlier had they known about the
privilege statute.'O° Of the 41 percent of patients withholding
information from their therapist, 13 percent indicated that a legal
privilege would have enabled them to be more open.' °' More re-
cent studies show that only a subset of patients, those with ten-
dencies likely to make them run afoul of the law, would attach
great importance to a legal privilege and its limits.0 2
Yet, does preserving a privilege really serve the patient's in-
terests? Psychologist James Beck studied the impact of nineteen
breaches of patient confidentiality in order to warn third parties
of possible danger."3 Of the nineteen cases, therapy improved in
two cases after the breach, did not change in thirteen cases, and
worsened in four cases."°4 According to Beck, mistakes by thera-
pists in failing to discuss warnings with their patients or in issu-
ing warnings without good reason, not the lack of a legal privi-
lege, caused bad outcomes in the last four cases. 5 - Psychother-
apy requires trust, but not necessarily confidentiality."°6 It fol-
lows that a breach in confidentiality will not necessarily harm the
relationship when the patient believes that the therapist be-
trayed the confidence for the ultimate good of the patient.
Psychotherapists who convinced patients in advance that the
warning would help them as well as the victim strengthened the
relationship despite breaching confidentiality. 7 Without the
warning, the patients might harm the potential victim and face
prison, or perhaps harm themselves.' 8 With a warning, the pa-
tient would be less likely to succeed in the attack, and both pa-
tient and victim would be better off in the long run.' Therapists
who did not discuss their warning with the patient in advance
caused significant harm to the therapeutic relationship in three
Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 111 (cited in note 9).
10 Id.
101 Id at 106.
' Taube and Elwork, 21 Prof Psych: Res & Prac at 72 (cited in note 84).
' James C. Beck, When the Patient Threatens Violence: An Empirical Study of Clini-
6al Practice after Tarasoff, 10 Bull Am Acad Psych & L 189, 193-95 (1982).
"" Id at 193.
. Id at 199.
Id at 190.
' Beck, 10 Bull Am Acad Psych & L at 194-95.
' Id.
lo Id.
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out of four cases."' When the therapist discussed the issue in
advance with the patient, fourteen out of fifteen study trials re-
sulted in a positive or neutral outcome."'
The ethical guidelines of the psychiatric profession already
require therapists to inform patients about privilege law at the
onset of therapy."' If Dr. Beck's analysis is correct, and if thera-
pists follow their professional guidelines, the lack of a privilege
may have few ill effects.
Several other authors support Beck's analysis. One psycho-
analyst has argued that strict confidentiality with self-
destructive people may prevent patients from facing their behav-
ior."' Another researcher has proposed that a limited privilege
may, over time, assist patients in controlling problematic behav-
ior."
D. Value of the Foregone Evidence
Even if a legal privilege provides little benefit to the practice
of psychotherapy, it may nevertheless be justified if that small
benefit still outweighs the value of the foregone evidence. The
Jaffee Court emphasized this point when it theorized that pa-
tients who realized that their communications would not be le-
gally protected would refuse to divulge incriminating information
to their therapists."5 Unfortunately, no empirical study supports
the Court's theory, despite its intuitive appeal.
I The lack of empirical support appears striking in light of the
popularity of some of the exceptions. One such exception limits
the privilege when the patient threatens to harm herself or an-
other party."6 Despite its moral appeal and its widespread accep-
tance in the psychoanalytic community," 7 no empirical study has
110 Id at 194. The harm typically consisted of a lack of progress in therapy. Id at 198.
' Beck, 10 Bull Am Acad Psych & L at 194 (cited in note 103).
12 American Psychiatric Association ("APA"), Guidelines on Confidentiality, 144 Am J
Psyc 1522 (1987) ("Whenever feasible, psychiatrists should inform their patients of the
general limits of confidentiality at the onset of treatment.").
..3 Stephen Appelbaum, How Strictly Confidential?, 7 Intl J Psychoanalytic Psycho-
therapy 220 (1978).
1' Jeffrey A. Klotz, Limiting the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Therapeutic
Potential, 27 Crim L Bull 416, 433 (1991).
m Jaffee v Redmond, 518 US 1, 11-12 (1996).
'6 Id at 18, n 19.
.1 Charles J. Meyers, Where the Protective Privilege Ends: California Changes the
Rules for Dangerous Psychotherapy Patients, 19 J Psych & L 5, 6 (1991) (commenting that
"[n]o psychotherapist can be licensed to practice in California without passing a test that
includes a plumbing of her understanding of her duty to warn and protect"). See also
Beck, 10 Bull Am Acad Psych & L at 190 (cited in note 103) (noting that patients in Mas-
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tested whether it has actually saved any lives, making it difficult
to assess the real benefits with any precision."' The same is true
for the child abuse exception, despite the fact that fourteen states
employ it.119
E. Implications of Empirical Evidence
The weak, equivocal data supporting the privilege strength-
ens the argument in favor of deferring to state law. Federal
courts have no clear scientific theory upon which to base a uni-
form national privilege. An arbitrary federal privilege will inter-
fere with state law for no good reason. Any federal rule that dif-
fers from state law will either undermine the state law or exclude
valuable evidence without providing a discernible benefit to psy-
chotherapy. Federal courts can avoid both of these problems only
by incorporating the privilege law of the states into the federal
common law.
III. USING REASON TO INTERPRET JAFFEE VREDMOND
The lack of empirical evidence that-the privilege confers some
benefit does not defeat it. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 refers to
"reason" as well as "experience." Reason, when contrasted with
experience, refers to moral and philosophical arguments not sus-
ceptible to objective proof.
A. Opposing Philosophical and Moral Arguments
Proponents of the privilege typically cite one of two argu-
ments in its favor. The first, known as the utilitarian
approach, 20 supports privileges whenever their benefits to society
exceed their costs.' 2 ' Commentators typically assume that the
utilitarian approach requires empirical confirmation to support
its validity. 2 The second, variously known as the humanistic
approach," the deontological approach,24 or the privacy ration-
sachusetts, where there is no duty to warn, are routinely warned of the limits of confiden-
tiality).
"8 Beck, 10 Bull Am Acad Psych & L at 192 (cited in note 103) (noting the absence of
empirical data on whether the duty to warn third parties actually prevents any violence).
See note 75.
Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 46 (cited in note 9).
,21 See McNaughton, ed, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 at 527 (cited in note 36) (arguing
that a court should only recognize a privilege when the injury created by disclosure ex-
ceeds the benefits gained by the evidence).
'" See Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 80-81 (cited in note 9).
Id at 46.
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ale," supports privileges because of the intrinsic importance of
privacy in certain circumstances. Although Supreme Court cases
such as Jaffee,'26 Nixon," and Trammel" used the utilitarian
approach, the Second Circuit," as well as various
commentators,"' have employed the humanistic argument, as-
serting that the court's moral obligation to avoid inflicting psy-
chological harm on the patient justifies the privilege. 3'
The utilitarian approach, which assumes the presence of
some experiential data, founders on the lack of evidence for the
privilege discussed in Part II. In contrast, the privacy argument
becomes more compelling.
The privacy arguments emphasize the direct harm of disclo-
sure to the patient. One version identifies two distinct kinds of
harm: the embarrassment of having secrets revealed to the public
and the forced breach of an entrusted confidence.' The first
harm comes from the act of revealing a private matter to the
public. The second comes from the sense of loss and humiliation
arising from the perception that a trusted adviser, the therapist,
has betrayed a personal confidence. Both harms are magnified
by the inherent vulnerability of the patient. Psychotherapists
create an atmosphere of trust."  Patients may be less guarded
with a therapist than with police, family, or friends. In police
custody, a suspect has Miranda warnings to remind her that she
need not incriminate herself." With family and friends, experi-
ence warns her that her confidences may be betrayed. In psycho-
124 Id.
12 Harvard Law Review Assn, 98 Harv L Rev at 1480-81 (cited in note 13).
Jaffee v Redmond, 116 S Ct 1923 (1996). Although Jaffee made reference to the
privacy rationale, the bulk of the Court's argument focused on utilitarian arguments. See
Part I A.
127 United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 711-12 (1974).
128 Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 50-51 (1980).
'" See Doe v Diamond, 964 F2d 1325, 1326 (2d Cir 1992) (holding that a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege exists because of the importance of personal privacy, the need for
informed medical assistance and widespread recognition of the privilege).
" See Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 47 (cited in note 9) (supporting
the deontological argument); Imwinkelreid, 73 Neb L Rev at 543-44 (cited in note 57)
(supporting the privacy argument over the utilitarian position).
"s' Harvard Law Review Assn, 98 Harv L Rev at 1481 (cited in note 13).
1 Id.
" Psychotherapists "are interviewers skilled in providing an atmosphere in which a
patient will feel comfortable expressing what he considers the truth about himself, no
matter how unpalatable. If these revelations become admissible in court, psychothera-
pists can find themselves reluctant forensic experts, testifying against their patients as
witnesses for the prosecution." Meyers, 19 J Psych & L at 27 (cited in note 117).
"' Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436(1966).
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therapy, she may or may not be warned." If she is warned, she
may forget the warning when encouraged to be frank. Therapists
take notes and sometimes tape record sessions. They can make
formidable witnesses.
As compelling as these arguments appear, they do not obvi-
ously trump the moral argument in favor of exceptions, which
rests on the value of protecting victims. Just as public disclosure
directly harms the patient, releasing the guilty harms the victim.
A privilege may deprive the victim of closure in a difficult period
of her life. A privilege may express the idea that the legal system
values the welfare of the defendant more than that of the victim,
reinforcing feelings of low self-esteem or guilt that the crime itself
engendered. In child abuse cases, victims are often helpless. The
testimony of therapists is unusually relevant in such cases be-
cause of the scarcity of other reliable evidence.'36
This sort of point-counterpoint on the relative harms to the
victim and defendant can continue without end. There is no way
to compare the harm to patients as a group with that of the class
of victims. Moral arguments cannot therefore provide a solid
foundation for a principled limitation on the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.
B. Institutional Capacities
Legislative judgment should trump that of the courts in bal-
ancing competing interests served by evidentiary privileges.
While one might worry that state legislatures may compromise
the rights of a politically unpopular minority such as mental pa-
tients, the actual politics of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
may benefit patients.
The proponents of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in-
clude organized interest groups such as the American Psychologi-
cal Association 3 ' and the American Psychoanalytic Association."
The therapists' interests coincide with those of the patients, a
group otherwise less likely to enjoy effective political representa-
tion. For clinicians, testifying takes time away from professional
practice, heightens patients' natural hesitation to reveal their
thoughts, and subjects them to cross-examination by hostile
counsel. Groups opposing a privilege, such as victim's advocacy
" See APA, 144 Am J Psychiatry at 1522 (cited in note 112).
'" See United States v Burtrum, 17 F3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir 1994).
'"' Jaffee v Redmond, 518 US 1, 35 (1996) (Scalia dissenting).
13 Id.
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groups, state prosecutors, and law-and-order politicians, lack a
unifying organization and therefore suffer free-rider problems
because many of the supposed benefits of their position will ac-
crue to others.3 9
Politicians, responding to the needs of therapists, will at the
same time protect the interests of the politically weakest group,
the patients. Because of this structural bias in favor of the
privilege, legislative passage of exceptions would require an
overwhelming public sentiment. Federal courts have no reason to
override the judgment of the legislatures in order to protect the
rights of a disenfranchised minority.4 '
The Supreme Court has noted that the balancing of compet-
ing political interests in defining legal privileges is particularly a
legislative function.' As the Supreme Court noted in Jaffee, the
uncertainty created by determining the scope of a privilege on a
case-by-case basis would defeat its purpose. The scope of the
privilege must instead be determined by broad philosophical, po-
litical and psychological arguments. All fift state legislatures
have implicitly reached this conclusion by enacting the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege as statute, rather than deferring to
the common law. Since Congress has declined to act on the
privilege, the second-best solution for federal courts is to incor-
porate the action of state legislatures into the federal common
law.
CONCLUSION
Reduced to its fundamental premises, the Jaffee Court based
the psychotherapist-patient privilege on: (1) the interest of the
patient in privacy, (2) the interest of the public in effective ther-
apy, (3) the assumption that patients will not divulge incrimi-
nating secrets, even if it limits the chance of successful therapy,
" Id at 36 (Scalia dissenting) (noting that no one filed amicus briefs against the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege because no self-interested organization devotes itself to the
pursuit of truth in federal courts).
"' For an argument that federal courts should overrule legislative action in order to
protect minorities, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 136 (Harvard 1980) C"[n]o
matter how open the process, those with most of the votes are in a position to vote them-
selves advantages at the expense of the others, or otherwise to refuse to take their inter-
ests into account. 'One person, one vote,' under these circumstances, makes a travesty of
the equality principle.").
11 University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 493 US 182, 189 (1990) (commenting that
courts should not establish a privilege when the legislature declined to do so because the
balancing of conflicting interests is particularly a legislative function).
142 518 US at 17.
" Green, et al, Federal Rules of Evidence at 103-06 (cited in note 55).
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and (4) the importance of not undermining the privilege law of
the states.
Upon investigation, the first three interests become insignifi-
cant. The victim's interest offsets the patients interest in pri-
vacy.'" The possibility that a skillful therapist can avoid the
negative consequences of disclosure moots the interest of the
public in effective therapy.45 The fact that most patients know
nothing about privilege law negates the assumption that patients
will not divulge personal secrets without a privilege.4 6 Only the
last argument remains valid. Lack of a federal privilege would
undermine individual state policy.
Federal courts have begun to face litigants arguing for excep-
tions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.47 To settle these
issues, federal courts should use the state privilege law governing
the therapist, even for federal questions.4 ' This conclusion fol-
lows from existing law, which allows the incorporation of state
law into federal questions when: (1) no federal statute applies, (2)
application of a uniform federal standard would impair the func-
tioning of state law in that area, and (3) no overriding federal
principle exists that would demand national uniformity. 49 All
three factors apply in this case.
The relevant federal statute, FRE 501, establishes a process,
not a substantive law. It mandates that federal courts develop
privileges through the common law in light of reason and experi-
ence, providing no criteria for comparing privileges. The first
criterion is therefore satisfied.
In addition, a uniform national standard would impair the
functioning of state laws, meeting the second criterion. Faced
'" See Part III A.
See Part II B.
Shuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study at 111 (cited in note 9).
... See, for example, United States v Hansen 955 F Supp 1225, 1226 (D Mont 1997)
(holding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege for a homicide victim terminates upon
death based on a broad interpretation of FRE 501).
"' The Jaffee Court placed one restriction on the psychotherapy privilege: lower courts
may not balance the patient's privacy interest against the court's need for evidence on a
case-by-case basis. According to the Court, a case-by-case balancing test would make the
privilege uncertain, and an uncertain privilege is little better than no privilege at all. See
Jaffee v Redmond, 518 US 1, 17 (1996) (criticizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege
statutes of Maine, New Hampshire, North Carolina and Virginia for mandating that
courts enforce the privilege on a case by case basis). See id at 18 n 18 (citing Me Rev Stat
Ann Tit 32 § 7005 (1964)); NH Rev Stat Ann § 330-Az19 (1995); NC Gen Stat § 8-53.7
(1986); VA Code Ann § 8.01-400.2 (1992). Because of Supreme Court precedent, federal
courts cannot defer to the privilege law of these states and must instead depend on tradi-
tional common law reasoning, which would likely lead to multiple exceptions to the privi-
lege in these states.
"' See Part I C.
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with different state and federal privileges, therapists and pa-
tients would inevitably conform their conduct with the weaker of
the two. The only way for federal courts to avoid this problem,
establishing a privilege with no exceptions, wastes potentially
valuable evidence and violates the rule of Fisher that privileges
exclude the least amount of evidence possible.' 50
The psychotherapist-patient privilege satisfies the third
point because no overriding federal principle exists that would
demand uniformity in light of either reason or experience. Moral
principles can either support or oppose exceptions. A utilitarian
analysis offers no better guidance without reliable empirical data.
Although a substantial argument supports the contention that a
legislature rather than a court should make the ultimate deci-
sion, Congress has refused to address the matter and establish a
national privilege law.
With no substantive federal law to apply, the prospect that a
national common law would undermine the laws of the states,
and no reason to establish national standards, the federal courts
should incorporate state law. Such an approach has the virtues
of simplicity and ease of administration. Courts need not waste
their time in a fruitless search for national standards, and thera-
pists and patients need not concern themselves with the vagaries
of conflicting state and federal standards. Federal courts need
not apply unfamiliar law, because they already must apply state
privilege law in diversity cases. Precedent, reason and experi-
ence lead to a single conclusion: federal courts should use the law
of the state in which they sit to identify exceptions to the federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege established under Jaffee v
Redmond. 5'
150 Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 403 (1976).
," 518 US 1 (1996).
